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Across the world, there are many countries where elections take place but are rigged by
governments or unfairly conducted. And even in core liberal democracies (like the United
States) political parties have now become deeply involved in gerrymandering
constituencies and partisan efforts at ‘voter suppression’. As part of our 2018 Democratic
Audit, Toby S James looks at how well elections are run in the UK, and whether the
systems for registering voters and encouraging turnout are operating effectively and fairly.
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What does democracy require for the conduct of elections? And how are voting,
candidacies and fair competition facilitated?
Governmental and legislative offices are open to popular competitive elections. All
citizens have the right to take part in the electoral process. All parties, interests and
groups assign great importance to maintaining universal and equal voting rights and to
encouraging electoral participation.
All votes count equally. So constituencies for all legislatures are (broadly) equal in size;
and seats are (broadly) distributed in proportion to population numbers. Some
variations in the population sizes of seats in order to facilitate more effective
‘community’ representation are allowable.
The registration of voters is impartially organised in timely, speedy, convenient and
effective ways. It maximises the ability of all citizens to take part in voting. Resources
are available to help hard-to-register groups to be enrolled on the register.
Voting in all elections is easy to do and the administrative costs for the citizen are
minimised. Polling stations are local and convenient to access, there are no long queues
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for voting, and voters can also cast votes conveniently by mail or online. Arrangements
for proxy voting are available. All modes of voting are free from intimidation, fraud-
proof and robust.
All citizens can stand for election as candidates, and they face no onerous regulatory or
other barriers in doing so. Some requirements for signatures or deposits are allowable
in order to obviate frivolous candidacies. But they must be kept low and proportional to
the seriousness of the offices being contested. All parties and groups assign top
importance to maintaining candidacy rights and facilitating effective electoral
competition and maximum choice for voters.
Political party names and identifying symbols can also be registered to prevent ‘passing
off’ strategies designed only or mainly to confuse voters. (Registering party names is
also essential in most PR systems where candidates are elected off party lists.) But
otherwise party or candidacy names may be freely chosen, and candidates can describe
themselves in any legal way.
All aspects of the electoral process are run impartially by trained, professional staffs in
secure ways that minimise any opportunity for fraud. Election administrators have the
legal ability to curb electoral abuses and to ensure that all candidates campaign legally
and within both the electoral rules and the normal legal requirements to show respect
for other citizens. Police and prosecution services impartially investigate and pursue all
allegations of electoral misconduct or corruption and prosecute when necessary in a
timely manner.
Incumbent governments at the national level and sitting MPs or members of legislatures
at constituency level must compete at elections on fully equal terms with all other
parties and candidates. They enjoy no special advantages.
Elections are welcoming and safe opportunities for voters and candidates to express
their views, whatever their political affiliations or social background. They are never
occasions for intimidation or the worsening of social tensions.
Election conduct and counting processes should be transparent and subject to inspection
by parties and candidates, and by external observers. Election processes and results
should be accepted by all domestic political forces as fully free and fair, and rated in the
same way by foreign observers.
The media system should be a pluralistic one, handling the reporting of elections and
campaigns in a reasonably fair and diverse way. There should be no direct state
interference in the reporting of elections or campaigns designed to secure partisan
advantages for the incumbents or for powerful parties.
Free and fair elections are essential for the democratic process, and the UK implemented
many of the requirements for them (including limits on local campaign spending) by the
1880s, although the franchise was not fully extended until 1928. The effectiveness of long-
unchanged ‘legacy’ rules, administration and practice of elections often decays over time,
however. As society changes, the effectiveness of old rules can drift and new problems can
emerge. The UK doesn’t have electoral irregularities on the scale commonly seen in
electoral autocracies (authoritarian states or where voting takes place but under rigged
arrangements) or the almost unrestricted corporate funding of elections in the USA.
However, there are many pressures on electoral integrity in the UK.
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Recent developments: elections, referenda and external
interference
The robustness and timeliness of the regulation of campaigns was brought into question
after the 2016 Brexit vote. As with any referendum, parties were not the vehicles leading
the campaign. Instead, special, one-off ‘referendum fighting organisations’ were
established and regulated. An official campaign for Leave (Vote Leave) and another for
Remain (Stronger In) were as recognised by the government and Election Commission and
each was assigned a relatively restrictive limit on their total spending. In addition, ‘allied’
organisations could register and be assigned smaller spending limits. After many
allegations of malpractice by the Leave campaign, an Election Commission report found in
June 2018 (two years after the vote) that Vote Leave had overspent its limit of £7.6m by
passing a payment of £650,000 to a one-person associated ‘campaign’ (Be Leave, run by a
graduate student). The main staffer of this organisation was on loan from Vote Leave and
they used the money to hire a firm to do its social media analytics. Vote Leave claimed that
the Commission had approved this at the time. Concerns were raised about how rules
seemed to be easily circumvented by the campaigners and an any investigation from the
Electoral Commission was only undertaken very belatedly and after a lot of prodding by
media investigations.
A second closely related area has been a surge of worries that external countries or agents
can too easily influence UK elections. Suggestions have been made that units close to the
Kremlin intervened in the Brexit campaign by establishing multiple robot sites to re-send
Leave-favouring messages on Facebook and Twitter, so as to artificially magnify their
apparent salience and influence. UK investigations are only slowly proceeding, however.
Concerns had been raised before, at the 2017 general election, after Russian sites were
boosting Labour-favouring social media messages, according to one study. The evidence
base for these worries remains very minimal, but the claims have gained currency because
of better-attested evidence of Russian interventions in the Donald Trump election campaign
and the threat that they would pose to electoral democracy and the international order, if
true.
‘Dark money’ and social media
These two developments illustrate a basic concern ‘dark money’ and social media. As
election campaigning increasingly shifts to the internet and social media new concerns
have also been raised about how undisclosed ‘dark money’ can influence elections and
undermine political equality. Political parties are reportedly increasingly making use of data
analytics to track voter behaviour on platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. This
information can then be used to target advertisements in marginal constituencies. This
involves a substantial investment of work and money in data analytics which does not
necessarily fall within the UK’s short official campaign period. Nor does this kind of
expenditure clearly fit within campaign spending categories that are regulated by law.
Campaign advertising laws cover TV and radio, but not social media. The playing field at
electoral contests may become increasingly uneven as a result, and there is a clear need
for election finance arrangements to be updated for the digital era.
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A 2018 Electoral Commission report claimed that the UK’s regulatory framework governing
elections in the social media age was radically inadequate. It proposed an extensive
modernisation of its powers to catch up by:
requiring all online materials by candidates, parties and campaigners to state who
created them;
make all campaigners declare in detail what they spent on digital activities in
campaigns;
require social media companies to label all election and referendum adverts with their
sources and create online databases of all such materials;
give the Commission itself more investigatory powers, and the ability to levy bigger
sanctions for breaches.
The government and opposition parties have not yet taken a stance on these proposals, so
that speedy remedial action seems unlikely.
The ‘age gap’ in voting
A third well publicised (and completely factual) development has been positive, namely the
reversal of the long decline in turnout in UK general elections. Figure 1 shows that from the
nadir of 2001, turnout rose by nearly 10 percentage points to 68.5% in the 2017 general
election. Moreover, it grew substantially amongst one of those groups who were
increasingly not exercising their democratic right – young people. In 2005 the UK had the
largest ‘age gap’ of any liberal democracy in the gulf between voters over 55 and under 34.
However, Figure 1 shows that turnout amongst the 18–24 and 25–34 age categories
substantially rebounded in June 2017. The age gap from 2005 and 2015 was effectively
halved.
Figure 1: The estimated turnout of different age groups at general elections from
1964 to 2017
Source: Computed by author using data from the British Election Study, IPSOS Mori and
BBC.
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Yet turnout remains a cause for concern. Differentials between age (and other) groups
have not disappeared. The method for calculating turnout in the UK (as a percentage of
registered voters) makes it look higher than it really is. The 2017 surge reflected somewhat
unusual conditions and turnout remains chronically low for other electoral contests. Up to
2015 a new political cleavage had arguably opened-up based on age, education and social
values rather than social class. Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour party has successfully focused on
gathering support from a new electoral bloc – with the newly re-energised youth a key part
of this. But whether this engagement can be sustained remains uncertain.
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT)
analysis
Current strengths Current weaknesses
Elections are generally very peaceful, and
intimidation or electoral fraud rarely occur,
although there are isolated problems.
Election results are well respected by
parties and citizens. International
observers have regularly expressed ‘a
high level of confidence in the electoral
process.’
One of the biggest problems is incomplete electoral
registers, owing to a system where it is an individual and
not a state responsibility to ensure names are on the
electoral roll. Many citizens fail to re-register because they
misunderstand the electoral registration process.
Estimates suggest that up to eight million citizens may be
missing from registers in recent contests, around 16% of
the adult population (see below).
No evidence has emerged that either
flaws in campaign spending or foreign
interference in either the 2016 Brexit vote
or the 2017 general election changed or
even significantly influenced the
outcomes.
We noted above, there were apparent major flaws in the
conduct and regulation of the 2016 Brexit referendum,
plus the alleged vulnerability of UK elections to social
media distortions of public debate and rigging of ‘fake
news’. Both raise acute new issues about whether current
safeguards are adequate or adapted for modern digital
conditions.
It is very straightforward to register a party
or to stand as a candidate at UK
elections, with very few regulatory
impediments. An election deposit of £500
is required to stand as an MP for
Westminster, returnable if the candidate
gets 5% of the votes. Higher deposits
apply for police commissioner elections
(£2000). Candidates also need relatively
few registered voters to sponsor their
standing (ten for Westminster).
At £500 per seat, the deposit cost of contesting every seat
in Britain at a general election is £314,000. This still
favours the most established parties over newcomers. In
2017 candidacies for UKIP fell sharply by 346 compared to
2015; and those for the Green party by 106. This partly
reflected lack of finance, and less time to raise finance
since the 2015 general election.
Procedures in polling stations are simple
and liberal. Currently voters do not need
to show ID but just give a name and
address. This makes voting very speedy
to do and facilitates maximum turnout.
Polling stations are also very locally
situated (mainly in primary schools or
community centres), and around 75% of
locations stay the same from one election
to another, so becoming familiar to
citizens.
There is an archaic, antiquated and illogical system for
determining who is allowed to vote (see below). For
instance, in Scotland (and soon Wales) teenagers of 16
and 17 can vote in elections for the Edinburgh Parliament
and local councils, but not for Westminster MPs. In
England and Northern Ireland they cannot vote at all. In
addition, there remains little or no citizenship education in
UK schools and available funds for this are tiny.
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The UK’s boundary review process
responds to statute and its
implementation timing is often politically
delayed and influenced. However, the
process of defining constituencies is
independent from politicians, which
prevents gerrymandering.
The robustness of the local and constituency regulation of
electoral spending is problematic at the margins (see
below). Constituency spending limits are set restrictively.
But national spending levels by parties are completely
unrestricted.
Electoral administration is chiefly run by
professional officials in local government,
who are independent from government
and local politicians. The Electoral
Commission is a national quasi-
government body that regulates electoral
finance and advises on election
procedures in an independent way. It has
been willing to criticise the government
when necessary and recently called for its
powers to be extended (see above).
The legislative framework is ‘complex, voluminous and
fragmented’ and in need of consultation. Isolated cases of
electoral fraud remain. Some vulnerabilities in electoral
registration remain. The system for securing electoral
justice is archaic and slow.
Critics argue that the regulation of campaigns require
modernisation – notably citing the 2016 Brexit referendum
(see above). They also say that the there is a need to
update the communication of election and candidate
information to citizens for the social and digital media age.
A modernised online electoral registration
system implemented by local authorities
has enabled many last-minute voter
registration applications. Timely
registration for upcoming contests is
much better developed than in the past.
Locating electoral administrators in local governments
means that many are operating under financial restraints,
following many years of austerity cutbacks . Systems for
registration are often dated. Arrangements for the effective
communication of results back to voters online are
problematic. The apparatus for communicating with voters
was basically defined in the 1880s and though candidates
addresses are listed on websites the approach has
otherwise been little updated for the social media era.
Cutbacks have especially restricted voter outreach work
by local authorities.
Civil society groups and NGOs (such as
‘Bite the Ballot’) have organised to
register and engage voters. They helped
to set out policy ideas through a
parliamentary group. Voter advice
applications also seek to reach people at
general elections who are not normally
politically engaged. And sites such as
Democracy Club and Democratic
Dashboard contribute to the provision of
information to citizens.
Further deficiencies in UK elections lie outside the area of
‘electoral integrity’ itself. The Westminster electoral
plurality voting system (also used in English and Welsh
council elections) often produces highly disproportional
results. In the media system the newspaper coverage of
candidates and parties remains systematically
unbalanced.
A modernised online electoral registration
system implemented by local authorities
has enabled many last-minute voter
registration applications. Timely
registration for upcoming contests is
much better developed than in the past.
Current strengths Current weaknesses
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Future opportunities Future threats
The Scottish government may bring
legislation forward to reform Scottish
electoral law and Welsh government is
reviewing local elections in Wales . This
could also provide opportunities for
innovation and learning across the UK.
Pilots to make voters show ID has been introduced in
five local authorities at England’s May 2018 local
elections. Early academic studies  showed that the
pilots were ‘unnecessary and ineffective.’ Future pilots
and the permanent compulsory requirements to
introduce voter ID may follow, which could reduce
turnout.
The Brexit negotiations offer an opportunity
for the concept of citizenship to be redefined
and electoral rights to be realigned.
The Brexit process may still end up leaving many EU
citizens resident in the UK with fewer electoral rights
than they have had up to now.
UK-wide pilots of automatic registration
could lead to cost efficiency savings, but
may also strengthen levels of voter
registration. The Missing Millions report from
the All Party Group on Democratic
Participation provides a roadmap for voter
registration reform.
Under the new individual registration systems electoral
turnout and registration levels have so far held up. But
they may drift downwards at subsequent elections
without the transitional efforts to boost registration rates
or high profile electoral events such as the Brexit
referendum.
A debate has opened up about the funding
of electoral services with the Scottish Local
Government and Communities Select
Committee reviewing arrangements.
Political advertising, external boosting of particular
campaigns, and other interventions via social media are
currently very little regulated (see above).
The Law Commission’s proposals to
consolidate the UK’s ‘complex, voluminous,
and fragmented’ sets of electoral law were
published in February 2016 – and provides a
blueprint for reforming electoral law.
Who is eligible to vote?
The electoral franchise, which defines who has the right to vote, is an essential part of what
it means to be a citizen within a polity. Excluding people from it immediately builds in
political inequality, and can lend itself to partisan ‘voter suppression’ effort, as in many
American states now.
The UK’s electoral franchise is an antiquated patchwork of historical legacies that lacks any
underlying principles. Citizens from qualifying Commonwealth countries and Ireland can
move to the UK and have full electoral rights immediately. Yet a citizen from the European
Union, who has lived and worked in the UK for most of their life, has rights for local and
European elections (while they last) but not for parliamentary elections, nor for major
electoral events like the EU referendum. Recent electoral events have affected them more
than any other group of people.
We noted in the SWOT analysis that 16- and 17-year-olds can vote in all Scottish elections,
and that this is planned for Wales, whereas these young people can’t vote in Westminster
elections, or in any other part of the UK. Theresa May has since restated opposition to
extending voting rights to 16-year-olds. During the Brexit referendum lead-up, Lords
amendments to grant 16- and 17-year-olds the right to vote were rejected by the
government, a decision that probably affected the result. Where the Conservative
governments have been proactive in expanding the franchise is for British overseas
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electors. The Overseas Electors Bill will give them votes for life, if passed (compared with
the current system where expats retain the franchise only for the first 15 years that they live
overseas).
Many recent electoral contests with profound consequences for public policy may have had
entirely different electoral outcomes if UK franchise arrangements were different. Current
provisions are largely unjustified, unbalanced and unequal. Meanwhile, the UK continues to
breach the European Convention of Human Rights in denying prisoners (other than those
on remand or serving sentences for contempt of court) any vote while serving their
sentence.
Fraud and malpractices
The government ran pilots in five local authorities to require voters in England to present
voter ID in the May 2018 local elections. But before those trials could be organised and the
results analysed, the Conservatives rushed to make a manifesto commitment at the 2017
election to make this a permanent and compulsory reform. Critics argued that it could lead
to many people being denied their right to vote because they do not have sufficient
paperwork to hand on election day – or that voters would refuse to provide it on ideological
grounds.
There is very little evidence that there is any significant voting fraud problem to be justify
the reform. Figure 2 shows data from a study of the 2018 English local elections which
identifies the frequency of problems in polling stations. Suspicions of electoral fraud in
polling stations was a tiny problem, and dwarfed by other problems. The overall number of
fraud cases under the current ‘high trust’ system is exceptionally low.
Figure 2: Problems experienced by poll workers at the English local elections 2018
Potential problem
Percentage of respondents reporting at least
one problem
People asking to vote but not on register 52
Disabled voters having problems completing ballot
papers
14
Members of parties being where they shouldn’t be 9
Disabled voters having problems with access to the
polling station
9
People taking photos of ballot/ polling station 8
Members of parties intimidating public 8
People ask to vote whose identity I was unsure of 5
Suspected cases of electoral fraud 1
Source: Clark and James, 2018
The ‘missing millions’ of unregistered citizens
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Figure 2 also shows that the more significant problem was citizens turning up to vote only
to find themselves not on the electoral register (although problems with accessibility for
disabled voters are also common). Research shows that many citizens think they are
registered because they access other government services and pay their council tax, when
they often are not. Figure 3 below shows the number of people missing from the electoral
register has gradually risen. If everyone was registered, the number of people on the
electoral register should be roughly in line with the annual mid-year population estimates.
But there has been a growing gap. And if there are duplicate register entries, which there
are, many more people may be missing. One assessment suggests the overall number
missed off could be up to eight million people.
Figure 3: The growing gap between the eligible total number of citizens/inhabitants
and total electors
Source: Author compiled from ONS Population Estimates and Electoral Statistics from 1
December each year. The local electoral register is used because it has the higher
franchise.
Under-registration is not equally distributed across the whole population, fuelling further
political inequality. Evidence shows the register is less complete in urban areas (especially
within London, where three out of ten people under 30 move borough every year). This
chiefly affects recent movers and private renters, Commonwealth and EU nationals, non-
white ethnicities, lower socioeconomic groups, citizens with learning disabilities and young
people.
The most worrying trend is with attainers – those citizens who will shortly reach the voting
age during the currency of the forthcoming register. Historically this was just 16- and 17-
year-olds, as only 18-year-olds can vote. But in Scotland and Wales attainers for devolved
and local elections can now be 14 or 15. And Figure 4 shows that from 2009 there has
been a decline in the number of attainer electors on the register (the grey line) compared
with mid-year estimates of 16- and 17-year-olds in the UK (and including 14- and 15-year-
olds in Scotland after 2015). Most of the next generation of voters already seem to be
missing from the register.
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Figure 4: The gap between eligible attainers (people nearing voting age, who should
be on the electoral register) and registered attainers
Source: Author compiled from ONS Population Estimates and Electoral Statistics. The local
electoral register is used because it has the higher franchise.
Two effects are at work here. The move to from household to individual electoral
registration was predicted to hit young people the hardest since their parents often
previously registered them, despite some counter-mobilisation efforts from civil society
which helped to avert this in the short-term. Second, electoral registration efforts in
Scotland may not have caught up with the new franchise. Simple solutions include the
automatic registration of young people at other government ‘touch points’, for example,
when they receive their national insurance card (needed for paid employment), or perhaps
register for post-16 education. Legislation was recently passed to require universities to
play a role in registering their students, one of the most under-registered groups. This may
have a positive effect in the longer-run.
Controlling election expenses at constituency level
Despite efforts to monitor and regulate electoral campaign spending locally, 2015 saw
allegations of significant breaching of electoral laws by 22 Conservative MPs and their
agents not declaring ‘national’ spending in fact carried out in their local area. The Tories
claimed that they had abided by the rules as set out, and never intended to breach
requirements. The Electoral Commission found significant breaches and that the Tory party
nationally showed an ‘unreasonable’ lack of co-operation with the Commission. Cases from
14 police forces were referred to the Crown Prosecution Service, which eventually only
decided to press charges in one case.
Yet charges were not pressed in many cases, not because the affair was trivial but because
of ‘insufficient evidence to prove to the criminal standard that any candidate or agent was
dishonest.’ Critics question whether current legislation requires such a high (or impossible)
threshold of evidence, that it is difficult to prevent loose interpretations from parties. In
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addition, there was a worrying effort by the governing Conservatives and the MPs involved
to criticise and discredit the neutrality of the Electoral Commission in unwarranted ways,
rather than to accept or respect the result of investigations. Such partisanship can only
undermine confidence in the electoral process in the longer term. An additional new
concern is that different requirements in Northern Ireland provide a backdoor for influencing
elections contests the UK.
Reviewing Westminster constituency boundaries
The Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government agreed that the size of the
House of Commons should be reduced from 650 to 600 MPs, with the populations
constituencies being equalised exactly. This would remove the previous tolerance for seats
being only broadly similar in size because of community and other factors, which meant
that the smallest constituencies were often in inner city areas held by Labour, while the
largest constituencies were in fast growing outer urban areas. A boundary review was set
in motion by the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Act 2011. However, the
Liberal Democrats subsequently withdrew co-operation on implementing the review, in
response to Tory backbenchers wrecking House of Lords reform, and nothing further
happened.
After the Tories gained a majority in 2015 fully equalised constituencies were revived and
the Boundary Commission published proposals in 2017, redone after the 2017 election,
with final details due by autumn 2018. Most estimates suggest that the Conservatives
would make perhaps 20 seat gains from 600 equal sized constituencies, with Labour the
chiefly loser. Yet some individual Tory MPs also risk seeing their established seats
disappear, and may not be keen to see that happen. Some press reports in autumn 2017
suggested that the May government would drop the proposals (which would require re-
legislating) altogether, since they are hard to get through a hung parliament. At the least,
many observers expect that no new boundaries may come into effect by the next general
election.
This might be a positive development for electoral integrity. One notable feature of the new
boundaries was that they used the December 2015 electoral register to estimate
populations – a snapshot of the electorate where millions were missing from the roll. Those
geographic areas or groups who are under-represented on the register, will therefore be
represented in a new parliament.
Conclusions
Elections are an indispensable way for citizens to have popular control of government, and
they are a fundamental foundation of political equality. At a time when democracy is thought
to be under threat, achieving these objectives have never been more important. UK
elections largely do this, but there are some underlying problems and new emerging
threats which require reform in many areas.
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Arguably, the paralysis caused by Brexit and the difficulties in legislating without a
government majority, might excuse a government for not having the capacity to undertake
the important changes. Nonetheless, some reforms, notably extending the franchise for
overseas electors and introducing voter ID requirements, seem to be forthcoming. The
problem, however, is that these do not speak in any way to the heart of the core electoral
integrity challenges faced in the UK and to some extent worsen them.
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